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Notes
A Closer Look At Disability "Buy-Outs"
For The Close Corporation
I. INTRODUCTION
Agreements to repurchase the stock held by the estate of a
deceased shareholder have been widely adopted by close corpora-
tions. A more recent extension of this practice is an agreement
to repurchase the interest of a shareholder who, due to accident
or illness, becomes disabled to such a degree that he can no longer
participate actively in the affairs of the business. Many of the
most persuasive reasons advanced for providing for the orderly
disposition of the stock of a deceased shareholder apply with
equal force to the stock of a disabled shareholder.'
The disability of a shareholder-officer of a close corporation
may put the other shareholders in an undesirable predicament.
Without his salary, the disabled shareholder may oppose any pro-
gram of expansion which would reduce the funds available to pay
the dividends which are the only return on his investment. Fur-
thermore, if dividends are not forthcoming, he may attempt to
sell his stock outside the present corporate structure to a buyer
unacceptable to the remaining shareholders. On the other hand,
if the disabled shareholder does not demand dividends or sell his
interest,2 he will be in a difficult position since, while he will par-
ticipate in the appreciation in value of the business as it grows, he
will not be able to realize present benefit from his investment.
A prearranged agreement for the repurchase of stock can
eliminate shareholder dissent, allow the corporation to return the
shareholder's appreciated capital to him for reinvestment in as-
sets with a greater present yield, and leave the benefits of con-
tinued growth of the business to those responsible for it. How-
ever, the disability buy-out agreement is not necessarily desirable
in all cases. It is the purpose of this Note to examine some of
the considerations of corporate and tax law which must be
1. On the basis of actuarial tables the chance of a shareholder
between the ages of 30 and 50 becoming disabled is 2 to 3 times
greater than the chance of his dying. W. HARiELI & R. OSLER,
BusINEss USES OF HEALTH INsURAxcE 1 (1960).
2. This may not be a matter of choice since a minority interest,
presuming that is what the disabled shareholder has, is not a readily
marketable commodity. See 2 F. O'NAL, CLOSE CorPOATIONS § 7.23
(1958); Herwitz, Stock Redemptions and the Accumulated Earnings
Tax, 74 Hrer. L. REv. 866, 897 (1961).
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weighed to determine the feasibility and desirability of such an
agreement and to propose guidelines where a disability buy-out
agreement is feasible.
II. CORPORATE INTERESTS IN PLANNING
A. CORPORATE LAW PROBLEMS
Because corporations must act within a statutory framework
limiting the scope of permissible activities, the planner must re-
main within that framework in attempting to formulate a work-
able disability buy-out agreement. Statutory limitations are
imposed on the funds allocable to repurchase and the methods
available to obtain additional funds both before and after the
agreement becomes operative. While all states grant a corpora-
tion the right to repurchase its own stock,3 they also regulate and
restrict such repurchases.4 Typically, the corporation can re-
purchase only out of "surplus"5 or some fraction thereof.6 Thus,
in order to be financially prepared to buy out a disabled share-
holder, the corporation must have surplus, or even earned sur-
plus, equal to the agreed or fair value of the largest shareholder's
interest. Even if this requirement can be met, the desirability
of maintaining the liquidity necessary to permit easy conversion
to cash decreases as the value of the shareholder's interest rises.
3. See 1 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACT. ANN. § 5, 11 2.03 (Supp.
1966); see generally Kessler, Share Repuw'chases Under Modern Corpora-
tion Laws, 28 FoRDHAm L. REV. 637 (1960).
4. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1708-08 (1955); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 160 (1953); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.6 (1965); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 513 (McKinney 1963).
5. The definition of this term varies among jurisdictions and be-
tween lawyers and accountants. The Model Business Corporation Act
adopts the following definitions:
(k) "Surplus" means the excess of the net assets of a cor-
poration over its stated capital [defiaed in subsection (j) ].
(1) "Earned surplus" means the portion of the surplus of a
corporation equal to the balance of its net profits, income gains
and losses from the date of incorporation . . . after deducting
subsequent distributions to shareholders and transfers to stated
capital and capital surplus to the extent such distributions and
transfers are made out of earned surplus....
(m) "Capital surplus" means the entire surplus of a corpora-
tion other than its earned surplus.
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. § 2 (1960).
6. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1707(c) (1955); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 23, § 32(b)(3) (1957); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 513(a) (McKin-
ney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-52(c) (1965) ("surplus"); TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT. art. 2.03C (1956) (but see art. 2.03D) ("earned surplus");
Cunningham, Stock "Buy-Out" Plans: Selections and Drafting, 18 MD.
L. REV. 277, 287 (1958); Kessler, supra note 3, at 653. But see Scriggins
v. Thomas Dalby Co., 290 Mass. 414, 195 N.E. 749 (1935).
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Arguably, the surplus can be obtained by a capital reduction prior
to the time of the buy-out.7 However, a capital reduction must
conform to statutory requirements which may limit the amount s
and the manner of such reduction.9 Furthermore, the allowable
uses of a capital reduction surplus may be limited by statute.10
Statutory problems may also arise in attempts to restore sur-
plus by cancellation of the repurchased shares.1" For example,
although the shares are repurchased out of earned surplus under
statutory requirements, the subsequent cancellation of the stock
will create capital reduction surplus, not earned surplus. Hence,
further repurchase with those funds will not be allowed under
some state statutory restrictions. Even where any type of sur-
plus may be used for repurchase, the cancellation of the repur-
chased stock will reduce capital only by the par or stated value
of the shares; the excess of the purchase price over the par or
stated value will not reappear in the surplus account.' 2
7. Cunningham, supra note 6, at 287.
8. The Model Business Corporation Act defines stated capital:
... the sum of (1) the par value of all shares of the corpora-
tion having a par value that have been issued, (2) the amount
of the consideration received by the corporation for all the
shares of the corporation without par value that have been is-
sued, except such part of the consideration thereof as may have
been allocated to capital surplus in a manner permitted by law,
and (3) such amounts not included in clauses (1) and (2)
. . as have been transferred to stated capital of the corpora-tion ....
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2(j) (1960).
9. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1904 (Supp. 1966) (both director and
shareholder vote); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 244(b) (Supp. 1966) (retire-
ment by lot or exchange of shares).
10. E.g., CAL. CorP. CODE § 1907 (1955) (fair value of assets is 14
times debts and liabilities); MINN. STAT. § 301.39 (1961) (limited by
existence of any preference). Capital reduction surplus is not part of
the earned surplus, see TEx. Bus. CoRP. AcT arts. 2.03C & 2.03D (1956),
and therefore will not be available for share repurchase in those states
limiting repurchases to amounts out of earned surplus. But see CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1906(a) (1955) (providing for limited use of capital re-
duction surplus for repurchase).
11. In most states the surplus account is reduced by the cost of
the shares. The net assets are then usually defined so as not to include
treasury stock. A few others adopt the position of the Model Business
Corporation Act § 5 and restrict surplus by the repurchase price. Hack-
ney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Business Corporations Act,
70 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1392 n.168 (1958).
12. To the extent that earned surplus or capital surplus is used
as the measure of the corporation's right to purchase its own
shares, such surplus shall be restricted so long as such shares
are held as treasury shares, and upon the disposition or can-
cellation of any such shares the restriction shall be removed
pro tanto.
ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 5 (1960). This provision leaves un-
clear whether the removal of the restriction applies to the full price per
1967]
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The use of a pre-repurchase capital reduction or subsequent
share cancellation raises the additional problem that neither is an
automatic source of cash. The reduction of capital does not
transfer funds into the cash account; it simply reduces the amount
of the asset cushion that the corporation is required to main-
tain for the benefit of its creditors. Consequently, if the cor-
poration does not have liquid assets equal to the amount of the
surplus, the surplus is usable only to the extent that nonliquid
assets can be converted into cash.
In determining the feasibility of a buy-out agreement in
light of the funding problems mentioned, the potentially detri-
mental consequences of not adopting the buy-out agreement
must also be considered. Several states, for example, have stat-
utes which provide a disabled minority shareholder with some
rights against the majority.13 Although these statutes are gen-
erally negative in effect, even a threat to invoke them can in-
fluence the majority to act to the detriment of the corporation.
In addition, if the disabled shareholder holds a majority interest,
the minority will be faced with a r.onparticipating shareholder
who, under corporate law, has control of the business. Even a
holder of fifty per cent of the stock can deadlock the corporation
so that dissolution may be the only answer. 14
share or only to the amount by which the stated capital has been re-
duced. The latter view seems to be the more logical approach.
13. The Minnesota Business Corporation Act provides that a two-
thirds vote is necessary to amend the articles of incorporation. MINN.
STAT. § 301.37 (3) (2) (a) (Supp. 1966). In Aiple v. Twin City Barge &
Towing Co., 274 Minn. 38, 143 N.W.2d 374 (1966), plaintiff owned
34% of the voting stock of the defendant corporation and had effec-
tively blocked all attempts to increase capital for expansion by amend-
ing the article. He brought suit to enjoin the establishment of a sub-
sidiary whose stock was to be used to increase capital. The lower
court's judgment granting the injunction on the ground that the corpora-
tion could not do indirectly what the statute prevented it from doing
directly was upheld. The supreme court admitted the minority share-
holder was probably asserting his rights to the detriment of the cor-
poration, but it held to the view that the state law gave him that
right. Id. at 45-46, 143 N.W.2d at 379. For similar statutory provisions
see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.53(c) (Supp. 1966); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14: 11-2 (1939); see generally R. STEisNs, CORPORATIONS 670 (2d ed.
1949). Other states allow provision for high voting and quorum re-
quirements in corporate charters and bylaws. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 816 (1955); DEL. CODE A-NN. tit. 8, § 102(g) (4) (1953). In addition,
many states have imposed on the majority shareholder a fiduciary
duty to refrain from arbitrarily acting to the detriment of the minority
interest. E.g., Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486, 487 (D.C. Cir.
1957); see generally 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 8.07 (1958).
14. See 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 13 § 9.02.
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There is hope for a workable solution to the problems raised
by the statutory restrictions on funding and the detrimental con-
sequences under corporate law of failing to adopt a buy-out agree-
ment. Both courts and legislatures are beginning to recognize
the basic differences between public and close corporations and
the need for less stringent governmental control of the latter. 15
For the present, however, strict application of local corporate
law to the particular facts and circumstances of each case is nec-
essary since there is no assurance all courts and legislatures will
adopt this attitude or extend it to the disability buy-out agree-
ment.
B. THE PROBLEMS OF CORPoRATE TAXATION
In most cases, the close corporation will be able to finance a
stock repurchase of any size only out of past or future accumula-
tions of earnings. 16 As a result, there is the possibility that the
accumulated earnings tax7 will be applied to these funds.'8
The purpose of the tax is to penalize a corporation for sheltering
its shareholders from tax liability by retaining earnings other-
wise available for dividend distribution. 9 However, the tax is
not self-assessing. A corporation is not required to pay the
tax until the Internal Revenue Service has determined that the
corporation was "formed or availed of" for the purpose of avoid-
ing tax on the shareholders. 20 Although this determination is
ultimately subjective, some measure of objectivity is derived
from section 533 (a), which provides that accumulations "beyond
15. See, e.g., Chambers v. Beaver-Advance Corp., 392 Pa. 481, 492,
140 A.2d 808, 814 (1958); Kauffman v. Meyberg, 59 Cal. App. 2d 730,
140 P.2d 210 (1943); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 620 (McKinney 1963);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-24(a) (1960); S.C. CODE AN. §§ 12-11.1 to -31.2
(Supp. 1964); Folk, The Model Act and the South Carolina Corporation
Law, 15 S.C.L. REV. 275, 281 (1963); Latty, The Close Corporation and
the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act, 33 N.C.L. REV. 26, 45
(1954); see generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 13.
16. See Herwitz, Stock Redemptions and the Accumulated Earnings
Tax, 74 HARv. L. REV. 866 (1961).
17. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 531-37 [hereinafter cited as INT.
REV. CODE]. For a detailed discussion of the accumulated earnings tax,
see generally 7 J. MERTENS, FEDERAL INcomE TAX ATION §§ 39.01-.58.
18. For some small corporations the accumulated earnings tax will
pose no problem since § 535 (c) (2) of the Code provides a basic credit
of $100,000 against accumulations. However, when applied, the effect of
the tax is severe. The present rate is 27.7% of the first $100,000 and
38.5% of the excess. INT. REV. CODE § 531.
19. INT. REV. CODE § 532 (a).
20. INT. REV. CODE § 532; B. BrInTER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CoRPoRATioNs AND SHAREoLnEms 218 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as B. BITTKER].
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the reasonable needs of the business" are presumptive evidence of
the prohibited purpose, subject to the corporation's right to prove
the contrary. Thus, in determining whether the possible accumu-
lated earnings tax liability constitutes a sufficient risk to make
a disability buy-out agreement inadvisable, two issues must be
faced: whether repurchase of a disabled shareholder's stock is
a sufficient business need to avoid the presumption of the pro-
hibited purpose, and whether, with or without the presumption,
the redemption will bar a finding that the underlying motivation
is tax avoidance.21
The question of what constitutes a reasonable business need
is complex and unsettled.22 Where evidence concerning business
need is offered by the corporation, a finding for the Commissioner
represents a substitution of judicial judgment for that of the cor-
porate directors. The courts have shown considerable reluctance
to make this substitution, at least when determining questions
under state corporation laws.23  Some of this reluctance has
carried over into the accumulated earnings tax area.24  As a
result, the Tax Court has intermittently passed completely over
the reasonable business needs issue and ruled directly on the
proscribed purpose question.25 However, most of the cases have
been won or lost on the reasonable needs issue, with the losing
party usually conceding defeat.26 The concession is encouraged
by section 535(c) (1), which allows a credit against the tax for
that part of the accumulation retained for the reasonable needs
of the business. Designed to eliminate the all-or-nothing ap-
proach to applying the tax under prior law,27 this section would
seem to require a finding on the issue of reasonable need for
the accumulation. 28
The question whether a disability buy-out agreement is a rea-
sonable need of the business has not been faced by the courts,
21. The presumption created in favor of the government by § 533
(a) does not work in reverse. Thus a finding of a reasonable business
need does not in itself bar a finding against the taxpayer on the
ultimate question of purpose. See Herwitz, supra note 16, at 870, 876.
22. On what constitutes a reasonable need, see generally J. MEa-
TENs, supra note 17, at §§ 39.31-.47.
23. 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 2104, at 481-88
(rev. vol. 1967).
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(a) (1959) states that the standard to be
applied is that of the "prudent businessman." See R. Gsell & Co. v.
Commissioner, 294 F.2d 321, 326 (2d Cir. 1961).
25. Herwitz, supra note 16, at 920.
26. B. BrrzzE 219.
27. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1954).
28. Cf. John R. Scripps Newspapers, 44 T.C. 453 (1965).
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and the Code and regulations shed little light on the problem.2 9
Attempts to draw analogies to cases involving other types of stock
redemption yield no conclusive answers as each case rests on its
own particular set of facts and circumstances, and each is in some
way distinguishable from the disability buy-out situation. Emloid
Company v. Commissioner" has often been cited as evidence of
judicial recognition of the reasonable need for stock repurchase
agreements. 31  However, Emloid involved a credit against ac-
cumulations for a debt incurred to purchase life insurance to
fund a death buy-out. Therein, it was certain that partial owner-
ship of the corporation would change hands at death and, there-
fore, there was a definite need to facilitate the change. In both
Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner 2 and Penn
Needle Art Company,33 the imposition of the tax was disallowed
where the earnings were used to repurchase the interests of
living shareholders, but shareholder dissension existed at the
time the buy-out was arranged in each case.34 With a disability
buy-out agreement, there is no certainty a shareholder will be-
come disabled or if he does, that he will dissent from existing
management policy or try to sell his stock. Thus the contingent
disability of a shareholder may be held an unrealistic hazard,
provision for which would not be a reasonable need of the busi-
ness.
A further problem arises if the corporation is sufficiently
29. The Code states that reasonable needs include reasonably an-
ticipated needs. INT. REV. CODE § 537. The regulations do not deal
specifically with accumulations to retire stock. See Treas. Regs. §§
1.537-1 to -3 (1959). The reasonableness of the accumulation will
depend on the facts of the particular case. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(a)
(1959). Accumulations for unrealistic hazards are not reasonable.
Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(c) (1959).
30. 189 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951).
31. See, e.g., Spindell, How the Emloid Case Reversal Upholds
Business Insurance Agreements, 93 J. Accou-Txcy 578 (1952); Young,
Stockholders' Agreement and Federal Taxation, 8 J. A.m. Soc'y C.L.U.
154 (1954). The language usually referred to is: "Harmony is the essen-
tial catalyst for achieving good management; and good management is
the sine qua non of long term business success." Emloid Co. v. Com-
missioner, 189 F.2d 230, 233 (1951).
32. 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960).
33. 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 504 (1958).
34. In Mountain State, no funds were accumulated until dissolu-
tion was threatened and the dissenters had exchanged their stock for
notes given by the corporation to cover the repurchase price. In Penn
Needle, funds had been accumulated for other purposes and were ap-
plied to redemption of the stock only after dissent had developed. Some
doubt has been cast on Mountain State as authority for accumulations to
repurchase. Herwitz, supra note 16, at 920-22.
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strong financially, absent prior acciumulations, to repurchase the
stock over a fairly short period of time subsequent to a dis-
abling accident or illness.3 5 The corporations best able to pro-
vide in advance for buy-outs are those most likely to be taxed
for doing so on the grounds that the provision was unnecessary.
These considerations suggest a possible distinction between
the treatment to be accorded pre- and post-redemption accumula-
tions.36 Where the corporation gives notes to the shareholder
for his stock and then accumulates funds to pay off the obligation
thus incurred, it is arguable that the accumulation should be
treated as one to pay off a bona fide debt of the corporation, and,
therefore, a reasonable business need.37 However, merely revers-
ing the sequence of events may prove insufficient to redeem an
accumulation which would otherwise be held unreasonable, es-
pecially if there is no evidence of actual shareholder dissent or
of disadvantageous sale at the time of the redemption.
Under the terms of the statute, the presence or absence of
a reasonable business need is not in itself the determinative
question.3 8 Even if there is no reasonable need, the tax will not
apply absent a finding of a purpose to avoid income tax on the
shareholders. Thus the uncertainty that the corporation faces
in establishing the reasonable need for a disability buy-out need
not affect the agreement's usefulness as a corporate planning
device so long as the agreement negates the existence of the
proscribed purpose. Unfortunately this is not necessarily the
case. Once again the decisions have little precedential value out-
side the context of their own facts and circumstances. Facts
probative of purpose in one case may be inconsequential in an-
other.3 9
The basic problem with the disability repurchase, as with
35. Cf. B. BnTnKR 220-21. In such a case it may be argued that
the accumulations were unnecessary.
36. See B. BiTTKIE 233; Herwitz, supra note 16, at 901. But cf.
Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 197 (4th Cir.
1957).
37. Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284
F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960), appears to treat a post-redemption debt as
such. See B. BIT=KER 233.
38. See Herwitz, supra note 16, at 1370. But see note 26 supra and
accompanying text.
39. One factor which appears to be generally treated as significant
is the past dividend record of the corporation. See Bachrach, Redemp-
tion May Not Prove Unreasonable Accumulation of Surplus; New Rules
Emerging, 10 J. TAxATIoN 84 (1959); cf. World Publishing Co. v. Com-
missioner, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 911,
rehearing denied, 336 U.S. 915 (1949). But cf. B. Brrrxf_ 217.
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other stock redemptions, is that it allows the corporation to
distribute earnings and profits otherwise subject to dividend
tax treatment at capital gains rates. This may constitute a basis
for finding a tax avoidance motive within the meaning of sec-
tion 532.40 This raises two preliminary questions: Is the pur-
pose of the seller or the remaining shareholders to be imputed
to the corporation, and to what extent must the proscribed pur-
pose have motivated the transaction?
It is obvious that in a close corporation any attempt to dif-
ferentiate between the objectives of the corporation and the ob-
jectives of its shareholders will in all probability prove futile.41
However, since the accumulated funds pass to the individ-
ual shareholder whose stock is redeemed, and he alone receives
the benefit of the capital gain treatment, it is difficult to find a
basis from which to infer the existence of the proscribed pur-
pose on the part of the other shareholders. Thus if the purpose
attributed to the corporation is that of the remaining sharehold-
ers, the tax may be avoided, but if it is that of the selling share-
holder, the corporation's position is more doubtful.
This suggests that a distinction may be drawn between re-
demption of a majority and a minority interest.42  General cor-
poration principles indicate that the purpose attributable to the
corporation should be that of those who control it. 43 Hence, if
the shares repurchased constitute a majority of the stock out-
standing, then the corporation must defend the selling share-
holder's motive. This is a defensible result since the majority is
in a position to cause the corporation to act for its benefit,44
and the minority shareholders, absent some special circumstances,
have no legally protectable interest in maintaining existing cor-
porate policies. 45
If the corporation must defend the motives of one who may
bring it within the section 532 proscription, it is material to deter-
mine the extent to which the proscribed purpose must be shown
to exist. Here also the cases conflict. The First Circuit's decision
40. B. BIT R 230.
41. See Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1957);
Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 650 (Ist Cir. 1949); Herwitz, supra
note 16, at 918.
42. See Herwitz, supra note 16, at 909-18; cf. Pelton Steel Casting
Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1958).
43. Herwitz, supra note 16, at 929.
44. For restriction on the majority's ability to so act, see Hill,
The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARv. L. REv. 986 (1957).
45. Herwitz, supra note 16, at 911.
1967]
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in Young Motor Company46 represents what would appear to be
the preferred position.47 The Tax Court in Young adopted the
position that the proscribed purpose need be only one among
other legitimate purposes.48  However, the court of appeals re-
versed, adopting a dominant or priacipal purpose test49 subse-
quently accepted by the Tax Court.50 However, other circuits
have applied a standard closer to that first adopted by the Tax
Court in Young, requiring that the motive need be only one of
the purposes for such an arrangement to fail.51 The only rea-
sonably certain conclusion which can be reached is that tax
avoidance need not be the sole purpose for the tax to be applied,
but it must at least be more than an incidental reason for the re-
purchase.5 2  Applying these considerations to stock redemp-
tions, Professors Bittker and Eustice have concluded:
Because the importance of the redemption to the corporate
business activities is often tenuous cr debatable ... the unset-
tled state of the law suggests caution in relying on the pro-
taxpayer decisions, especially if the contemplated redemption
is not likely to occur until a distant future date .... If the
redemption ... is required by a shareholder agreement to re-
tire the shares of any party thereto upon his death or retire-
ment, it seems even more vulnerable.53
These admonitions apply with equal force to the disability buy-
out.
6 4
46. 281 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1960), rev'g and remanding 32 T.C. 1336
(1959); Young Motor Co., 21 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 711 (1962), rev'd and
remanded, 316 F.2d 267 (1st Cir. 1963); Young Motor Co., 23 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 113, af-'d, 339 F.2d 481 (1st Cir. 1964).
47. Herwitz, supra note 16, at 876.
48. 32 T.C. at 1345.
49. 281 F.2d at 491.
50. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 113.
51. E.g., Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir.
1961). For a discussion of the purpose requirement see J. MERTENS,
supra note 17, §§ 39.26-.27.
52. B. BITTKEm 216.
53. Id. at 231.
54. Note also that even if the redemption of stock standing alone
does not justify imposition of the accumulated earnings tax, it may be a
factor in determining whether the overall accumulations of the cor-
poration go beyond the reasonable needs of the business. See Frenco,
Inc. v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 317 (D. Md. 1964); Mountain State
Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737, 745 (4th Cir. 1960).
Moreover, since the accumulated earnings tax may be imposed after the
buy-out, the planner drafting the agreement should make some provi-
sion to allocate the loss between the shareholders and the corporation.
Otherwise, the disabled shareholder is the only one who has participated
in the distribution of the accumulation, and yet absent such a provi-
sion, he will not be affected by the payment of the tax.
[Vol. 52:483
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An additional tax problem for the corporation is the pos-
sibility that the remaining shareholders will be deemed to have
received a dividend by virtue of the fact that their interests have
been enhanced by the elimination of the disabled shareholder's
stock. However, such a determination has been foreclosed for
the present. Revenue Ruling 59-28655 states: ". . . [T]here is
no authority affirmatively supporting the proposition that a
redemption of one shareholder's shares, at fair market value,
constitutes a dividend to a remaining shareholder."56 Under this
ruling the transaction may be taxed as a dividend only if it is
determined to be in substance a purchase by the remaining
shareholders, financed by the corporation.57
III. SHAREHOLDER INTEREST IN THE BUY-OUT
A. CORPORATE LAW PROBLEMS
A persuasive argument to induce a minority shareholder to
enter a buy-out agreement is the problem he would face in at-
tempting to compel the corporation to pay dividends.58 Courts
are reluctant to interfere with the internal affairs of corporate
management, and it is well-settled doctrine that the payment of
any dividends lies in the discretion of the directors.59 With
this burden to overcome, the shareholder may feel that it is
better to plan in advance to have the value of his assets returned
to him in the event he is no longer able to participate actively
in the management of the business.60
55. 1959-2 Cum. BuLL. 103.
56. Id. at 105.
57. Id.
58. See generally F. O'NEAL, CLOSE COPORATIONS § 8.08 (1958);
Comment, Dividends in Closed Corporations, 56 Nw. UL. REv. 503(1961).
59. E.g., Moskowitz v. Bantrell, 190 A.2d 749 (Del. 1963); Lockley
v. Robie, 301 N.Y. 371, 93 N.E.2d 895 (1950); H. BALLANTINE, CORPOiA-
TIONS § 231 (rev. ed. 1946); F. O'NEAL, supra note 58, at 112; see Cash-
man v. Petrie, 14 N.Y.2d 426, 428, 201 N.E.2d 24, 25, 252 N.Y.S.2d 447, 448
(1964) (dictum) (citing cases).
60. This consideration will weigh particularly heavily if the cor-
poration has elected to be taxed as a small business corporation under
Subchapter S. See INT. REV. CODE §§ 1371-77. Such an election means
that each shareholder will be taxed on the undistributed taxable income
of the corporation according to his proprietary interest. INT. REV. CODE
§ 1373. Once an election is made a shareholder cannot withdraw his
consent, and it can be revoked only by the consent of all the share-
holders. See INT. REV. CODE § 1372(e) (2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-3 (a)
(1956). Thus a shareholder may find himself unable to compel dis-




However, the statutory restrictions on the funds available to
repurchase stock may adversely affect a shareholder's willing-
ness to be bound by a buy-out agreement. Whatever the finan-
cial position of the corporation at the time the agreement is
entered into, an absence of the requi:ed surplus at the time the
agreement becomes operative will render performance impos-
sible. Additional problems arise if the purchase is to be by in-
stallments. The surplus test may have to be met as the install-
ments fall due as well as at the time the buy-out becomes oper-
ative.61 Thus, if the corporation is unable to meet the surplus
requirement, the shareholder will have surrendered his stock
and yet be unable to compel payment for it. He can either do
nothing and hope the corporation's financial condition improves,
or attempt to force the return of his stock. If he adopts the latter
course, he will probably be able to recover only the unliqui-
dated shares unless he can return the payments already made.
Such a transaction will impair his voting rights, especially if
his original holding was fifty per cent or more of the stock. 2
The same type of double test may be applied in cases of in-
solvency,63 although the magnitude of the insolvency problem is
mitigated by two factors. If the shareholder takes notes for his
stock and the corporation becomes insolvent, it has been held
that the note holder will stand between the general creditors
and the other shareholders in order of preference, 64 one step
61. E.g., Kleinberg v. Schwartz, 87 N.J. Super. 216, 208 A.2d 803(App. Div.), certification granted, 45 N.J. 33, 210 A.2d 779 (1965); Cut-
ter Labs, Inc. v. Twining, 221 Cal. App. 2d 302, 34 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1963);
Burk v. Cooperative Fin. Corp., 62 Wash. 2d 740, 384 P.2d 618 (1963).
62. Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus Limita-
tions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 303, 315 (1965).
63. E.g., In re Trimble Co., 339 F.2d 838 (3rd Cir. 1964); In re
Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 F. 357 (2d Cir. 1914); Herwitz, supra note
62. Insolvency may mean either that the corporation is unable to pay
its debts as they come due (the equity sense), or that its assets do not
equal its liabilities (the bankruptcy sense). Kessler, Share Repurchases
Under Modern Corporation Laws, 28 FonDutm L. REv. 637, 643 (1960).
The Model Business Corporations Act defines insolvency in the equity
sense. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT § 2(n) (1960). Some states
refer specifically to both types of insolvency. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE
art. 23, § 32(c) (1957); TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT art. 2.03(f) (1956).
64. In re Dawson Bros. Constr. Co., 218 F. Supp. 411 (N.D.N.Y.
1963); Baxter v. Lancer Indus., Inc., 213 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1963);
In re Fechheimer Fischel, 212 F. 357 (2d Cir. 1914) ; see also R. STEVENs,
CORPORATIONS 286 n.53 (2d ed. 1949); Herwitz, supra note 62, at 319;
Kessler, supra note 63, at 673. At least one case has held that the
note holder is entitled to share equally with the general creditor.
Wolff v. Heidritter Lumber Co., 112 N.J. Eq. 34, 163 A. 140 (Ch. 1932).
However, in that case the corporation could have paid cash as it had
sufficient surplus at the time of the repurchase.
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above where he would have stood had he not sold the shares for
the notes. In addition, given the normal marketability of a
minority interest in a closed corporation, if there is no bank-
ruptcy action, the shareholder is in no worse position than he
would have been had he retained his shares.
The restriction or cancellation of surplus used to repurchase
stock65 raises an additional problem: at what point and to what
extent is the surplus to be restricted or cancelled-up to the
full price at the time of purchase, or up to each installment as
paid?6 If the latter, then the shareholder should require that
some restriction be placed on the otherwise unrestricted surplus,
otherwise the funds sufficient to pay off his notes may be dis-
tributed to the other shareholders.67
B. TAX CONSEQUENCES TO THE SHAREHOLDER
One benefit which may result from a stock repurchase is
the realization by the shareholder of all or part of his share of
the earnings of the corporation at capital gains rather than ordi-
nary income tax rates. This will be possible only if the re-
turn can be categorized as a distribution in exchange for stock
under section 30268 and not a distribution of property under
section 301.60
65. Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Business Cor-
porations Act, 70 HAnv. L. REv. 1357, 1392 n.168 (1958).
66. Herwitz, supra note 62, at 316.
67. This type of protection by restriction should be given careful
consideration by the planner. In addition to restricting surplus, it may
be advisable to limit dividends, salaries, and the issuance and redemp-
tion of preferred stock while the installment obligation to the disabled
shareholder remains outstanding.
68. Section 302 provides that a redemption will be treated as an
exchange if it qualifies under one of the tests of § 302(b), i.e., (1) not
essentially equivalent to a dividend, (2) substantially disproportionate
as to the shareholder as that term is defined in § 302(b) (2) (c), or (3) a
complete termination of the shareholder's interest. See generally D.
HERwiTz, BusINEss PLANNING 476-81 (1966).
69. An alternative with the same effect would be treatment of the
redemption as a partial liquidation under § 346. However, that section
is not generally applicable to a disability buy-out situation. In order to
qualify as a partial liquidation a redemption must be either part of a
plan to completely liquidate the corporation or not essentially equiva-
lent to a dividend, effected pursuant to a plan, and occur either in the
year the plan is adopted or the following one. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.346-1(a)
(1)-(2) (1960). Further, § 346(b) (1) and the case law in the area indi-
cate that contraction of the business is a primary factor in determining
whether there has been a partial liquidation of the corporation. This
will probably not be the case with a disability buy-out. See Bittker,
The Taxation of Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations, 44 CORNELL
L.Q. 299, 307 n.2 (1959) (criticizing the use of this factor); Chommie,
Section 346(a) (2): The Contraction Theory, 11 TAx L. REv. 407 (1956).
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The specific tests under section 302(b), disproportionate
redemption and termination of interests, must be applied first.70
Section 302(b) (2) clearly sets out the necessary percentages and
limitations for a redemption to be classed as disproportionate.
It is obvious that if the corporation repurchases all of the share-
holder's stock at one time, the result is both a substantially dis-
proportionate purchase and a termination of the shareholder's
interest. However, if the shareholder sells only part of the
shares at any one time, each sale must meet the percentage re-
quirements of section 302(b) (2). If the repurchase does not
qualify under sections 302(b) (2) or (3) the shareholder is still
free to argue that the redemption is not essentially equivalent to
a dividend under section 302 (b) (1).
The major problem in dealing with sections 302(b) (2) and
(3) is that under section 302 (c) (1) the attribution rules of section
318(a)7 1 are to be applied "in determining the ownership of
stock for purposes of this section [302]." Thus if the close cor-
poration's stock is held within a family group, as is often the
case, or if part of the stock is held by a trust of which the share-
holder is a beneficiary, or if held by a partnership or other cor-
poration with which he is associated, all or part of the stock so
held will be deemed owned by him in determining whether or
not the redemption is disproportionate 72 or a termination of his
interest.73 The net result may be that it is impossible for the
70. Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 194-95 (4th Cir. 1962).
71. Section 318 (a) provides for attribution in the following cases:
1) stock owned directly or indirectly by or for an individual's
spouse, children, grandchildren, or parents is constructively
owned by him;
2) stock owned by an estate, trust, partnership, or corporation is
constructively owned by a beneficiary, member, or 50% share-
holder, in proportion to his interest.
3) stock owned by a beneficiary, member, or 50% shareholder is
constructively owned by the estate, trust, partnership, or cor-
poration.
Further, under the operating rules of § 318 (a) (5), stock constructively
owned under any of the above is considered actually owned for pur-
poses of reapplying those rules except that rule (1) cannot be reapplied
and stock constructively owned under rule (3) cannot be reattributed
under rule (2).
72. The attributions rules will be applied to both the determination
of a 50% voting stock holding after redemption under § 302(b) (2) (B)
and to making of the disproportionate redemption test under § 302 (b)
(2) (C). Treas. Regs. §§ 1.302-3(a) (3) (1960), 1.318-1(b) (3) (1962).
73. A further complication is introduced by § 318(a) (5) which,
with two notable exceptions, provides for a second step in attributing
stock ownership. If stock is held by a trust for the benefit of a share-
holder's spouse, children, or parents, the ownership is attributed to
them under § 318 (a) (2) (B). Under (a) (5) this ownership is deemed to
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redemption of the stock of a particular shareholder to qualify
under either subsection. However, there are ways to avoid this
problem.
Under section 302(c) (2) the application of section 318 (a) is
waived in the case of a redemption otherwise qualifying as a
complete termination of the shareholder's interest, provided
certain conditions set out in the subsection are met.7 4  The
purpose of the waiver is to allow a shareholder in good faith to
sever his interest in the corporation with the benefit of capital
gains treatment. However, the conditions imposed are stringent
to prevent abuse of the privilege.75 Any attempt to retain the
shareholder in a nominal officer or directorship capacity, con-
tinue his participation in an income continuation plan,7 6 or
have him return to active participation in the affairs of the cor-
poration within ten years will render the waiver inapplicable.
There are two further and, in some cases, more severe limita-
tions on the use of the waiver. First, it applies only to a section
318 (a) (1) situation-family attribution-and not to (2), (3), or
(4), to and from partnerships, estates, trusts, corporations, and
covering options. As a result, one who has stock ownership
attributed to him by virtue of his connection with an estate,
partnership, or corporation cannot avail himself of the waiver
provision.7 7  The regulations also provide that the creditor in-
terest a shareholder may retain under the subsection means one
that is not subordinated to those of general creditors. 78 Thus,
taking notes of the corporation in exchange for stock may not
qualify for the benefit of section 302(c) (2).
Another possible solution to the section 318 problem may
be provided by section 302(b) (1). As previously mentioned,
be actual for the purpose of attributing those shares to the stockholder
in question. See Thomas G. Lewis, 35 T.C. 71, 78 (1960) (stock owner-
ship attributed from husband to wife and then to estate of wife's
mother).
74. These conditions are numerous and complex. They include a
10-year limitation on reacquiring an interest, and the time and circum-
stances of the acquisition of the redeemed stock. INT. REv. CODE § 302
(c) (2).
75. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1954); S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 45 (1954).
76. See Bittker, Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations Under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 9 STAx. L. REv. 13, 33 n.72 (1956),
contending that § 302(c) (2) (A) (i) has a continued financial interest as
its primary concern and is not intended to prohibit continued office
holding per se.
77. See Rev. Rul. 59-233, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 106.
78. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-4(d) (1960).
19671
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
a redemption which fails to qualify under the specific tests may
still receive capital gains treatment if it is not essentially equiv-
alent to a dividend. Generally, one of two tests is used in deter-
mining dividend equivalency, although the line between them
is often clouded.79 The "net effect" test considers whether the
results of the redemption and the hypothetical results of a divi-
dend replacing the redemption would have been essentially
the same from the shareholder's point of view. If so, the pay-
ment is considered substantially equivalent to a dividend and
taxed as ordinary income.80 The "legitimate business purpose"
test combines the net effect test with a consideration of whether
the redemption was motivated by a corporate or a shareholder
purpose.8 1 In view of the fact that the shareholder has given up
his right to future earnings and his voting power, it would seem
that a disability buy-out would qualify under the net effect test.
If this is the case it would clearly qualify under the more liberal
legitimate business purpose test as well.
By qualifying as not essentially equivalent to a dividend, a
redemption otherwise taxable as a dividend under section 318
may receive capital gains treatment, since section 302(c) (1), ap-
plying section 318 (a) to section 302, states that it "shall apply
in determining the ownership of the stock" and unlike (b) (2)
and (3), (b) (1) does not refer to, or by its terms depend on, the
extent of subsequent ownership. The possibility of a construc-
tion of (b) (1) requiring no reference to section 318 (a) has
been foreclosed by regulations providing that constructive own-
ership under that section is one of the facts to be considered in
determining dividend equivalency.82  The result is that the
attribution rules which may have been an absolute bar to capital
gains treatment under (b) (2) and (3) are only a single factor,
albeit a significant one,83 among the several to be considered in
79. Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 196-97 (4th Cir. 1962).
80. E.g., Kessner v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1957).
Some of the considerations involved are whether the amount received
would have been the same, how much control was given up, and what
right to future earnings was lost. Id.
81. E.g., Herman v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1960);
Perry S. Lewis, P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 47.12 (1966); John A.
Decker, 32 T.C. 326 (1959). But see B. B.TK.ER 293. Under either test
there appears to be considerable weight given to how disproportionate
the redemption really was. Compare Estate of Arthur H. Squiers,
35 T.C. 950 (1961), with Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st
Cir. 1962).
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1960) (narrow construction of ap-
plicability of § 302 (b) (1) to stock redemptions).
83. Cf. Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962).
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determining the status of the redemption. In Perry S. Lewis,8 4
a shareholder qualified for capital gains treatment on the sale of
his stock over a five-year period even though his sons held all
the remaining stock and he retained a nominal officership in
the corporation. The court applied the legitimate business pur-
pose test, finding considerations of business purpose sufficient
to dispel the taint of dividend equivalence,8 5 while giving no
weight to the shareholder's constructive ownership of his sons'
stock.
An additional, and more certain, method of avoiding the ap-
plication of section 318 (a), or any other chance the operation of
the agreement will be deemed to produce a dividend to the
selling shareholder, is to have the stock purchased by the other
shareholders or by a trust. However, this method, while elimi-
nating the dividend problem, creates problems of its own.
If the agreement provides for purchase of the shares with
payment by installments, the disabled shareholder will face fur-
ther tax problems absent careful drafting. For example, the
sale of the stock to the corporation or to the other shareholders
is a casual sale of personal property within section 453(b) (1),86
provided the conditions of the statute are met.87 By meeting the
requirements of this section, the shareholder is able to pay the
taxes on the proceeds of the sale as he receives them. Otherwise
he would have to pay the taxes on the full amount of the gain
at the time of the sale. Thus in drafting an agreement which
provides for an installment purchase the terms should be drawn
to fit within section 453 to spare the shareholder the burden
of being taxed on more than his in-hand profits. A further con-
84. P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. if 47.12 (1966). But see Thomas
G. Lewis, 35 T.C. 71 (1960) (applying second step attribution under
§ 302(b) (1) ). However, the Tax Court subsequently modified the
strict application of § 318 adopted in Thomas G. Lewis in Arthur H.
Squiers, 35 T.C. 950 (1961), acq'd, 1961-2 CuM. ButL. 8.
85. Perry S. Lewis, P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 1 47.12, at 97
(1966). The concurring opinion, while holding no dividend, criticized
the majority for failing to give adequate consideration to the attribution
rules.
86. Rev. Rul. 56-153, 1956-1 Cum. BuLL. 166.
87. INT. REV. CODE § 453(b) (2). There may be a conflict between
the requirements and the obtaining of capital gains treatment as a
disproportionate redemption if the price per share is such that 30% of
the total price will not purchase enough shares to meet the percentage
requirement of § 302(b) (2).
Failure to provide for interest or attempt to hide the interest within
the price to get capital gains treatment may place the sale under § 483
and the unstated total interest covered therein will not be includible in
the selling price. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-1(b) (2) (1966).
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sideration for a shareholder contemplating an installment pay-
ment type of agreement is the possibility of his death before the
end of the payment period. At death, the fair market value
of the unpaid installments will be included in his gross estate for
estate tax purposes under section 2031(a). s This will in-
crease the tax liability of the estate while providing no additional
cash with which to pay it. 9
III. POSSIBLE METHODS AND SUGGESTED PROVISIONS
FOR ESTABLISHING A DISABILITY BUY-OUT
A. THE USE OF DisAB.miy INSURANcE
Disability insurance may be used as a funding device in
setting up a disability buy-out.9 0 Disability insurance is de-
signed to indemnify the policyholder against loss of income by
providing him with periodic benefit payments while he is dis-
abled. The contract is similar to indemnity insurance in that it
is aleatory in nature, and resembles life insurance since it deals
with human life and pays a fixed amount regardless of actual
loss. This type of coverage varies with the insurance company
on such factors as the insurer's right to cancel or change pre-
mium rates, the size of the benefit payment, and the length of
time such payments are to run.9 1
The concept of disability is largely subjective. As such, it
is difficult both to underwrite and to police. 92 Insurance com-
panies must, therefore, confine their policies strictly, limiting
the disabilities covered as to degree, duration, cause, and time of
88. Cump v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1941);
see Duffield v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
89. As installment obligations under § 453, the payment will be
considered income in respect of a decedent under § 691 (a) (4). The
installment, therefore, will be taxable as income when actually paid.
However, the estate tax paid may be credited against the subsequent
income tax liability under § 691(c). For the proper method and an
indication of the complexity of computing and allocating this credit
see Rev. Rul. 67-272, 1967 INT. REV. BULL. No. 31, at 11. On the propriety
of taxing both the right to the payments and the payments themselves,
see Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 256 (1935).
90. See, e.g., W. HARMELiN & M. FREmAN, DISABILITY INSUR-
ANCE IN THE BusnqEss Buy-OUT AGREEMENT 3-4 (1963); W. Hm~ ww
& R. OSLER, BUSINESS USES or HEALTH INSmIuWCE 10 (1960).
91. E. FAULKNER, HEALTH INSURANCE 64-69 (1960); W. HAPMELIN
& R. OSLER, supra note 90, at 3-4, 11; Miller, Disability Income-In-
dividual Policies, in LIE AND HEALTH INSURANCE HANDBOOK 581, 588-89
(1959).
92. See Day, Legal Problems in Disability Insurance, 1957 INs.
L.J. 19, 20; Siebert, The Insured Event: Disability Insurance, 1964 U.
ILL. L.F. 382, 383-84.
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inception, as well as providing certain exclusions.9 3 The amount
of benefit coverage available is also limited. At present, $1,000
per month is the approximate ceiling on long-term disability
coverage.9 4 In order to limit the risk of malingering, insurers
have established the practice of not insuring for an amount in
excess of eighty per cent of the insured's after-tax income.9 5
Further, companies normally will not contract to pay benefits,
at least for disability due to illness, beyond age sixty-five.9 6
These limitations may pose serious obstacles for the planner
desiring to use disability insurance as a fund for a buy-out
agreement. Initially, the narrow and inflexible definition of
disability may limit the applicability of insurance in a particu-
lar business. In addition, the companies use a split definition
of the term 1, which may impose a further limitation on the use-
fulness of insurance as a planning device. The first defini-
tion bases benefits on the insured's inability to continue in
his present employment, but it covers only an initial period.
The second, which is far more restrictive, bases benefits on the
insured's inability to be gainfully employed, and covers the re-
mainder of the benefit period.98 Under such a split definition
a disabled shareholder may fail to qualify after the initial period,
and the benefit payments which were intended to fund the buy-
out will be discontinued.
An additional problem is imposed by the benefit limitations.
The higher the value of the shareholder's interest, the longer
the installment payment period will be. Depending on the share-
holder's age at the time he becomes disabled coupled with the
nature of his disability, increasing the installment period also
increases the chances either that the policy coverage will termi-
nate or that the shareholder will recover sufficiently so that
the benefit payments will be discontinued prior to completion of
the repurchase. In either event the purchaser will be left to
satisfy the purchase debt out of other resources. The problem is
93. Siebert, supra note 92, at 384.
94. W. HARmELIN & R. OSLER, supra note 90, at 11.
95. Faulkner, The Role of Health Insurance, in LIFE AND HEALTH
INSURANCE HANDBOOK 523, 527 (1959).
96. W. HABmi= & R. OSLER, supra note 90, at 11.
97. See also Miller, supra note 91, at 584.
98. The rigor of these definitions has been mitigated by the liberal
interpretation of the courts. See generally Day, supra note 92, at 22-28.
While these judicial definitions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
one that has gained fairly broad acceptance holds an insured totally
disabled when he is unable to carry out the duties of any work or pro-
fession for which he is fitted by education, training, and experience.
Siebert, supra note 92, at 389-90.
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compounded if the shareholder has a private disability plan in
force. In order to avoid possible over insurance, applications for
disability coverage inquire as to any other disability benefit to
which the applicant is entitled or for which he has applied, as
well as to his average income.9 9 In addition, some policies will
contain a pro rata clause'0 0 which will also restrict the amount
of the benefits.' 0 '
A further problem with insurwace funded buy-outs is the
insurability of the shareholders and the cost of obtaining such
insurance. It may be impossible to obtain the type of coverage
necessary because of one shareholder's poor health, medical
history, or age.'0 2 The most desirable coverage-maximum bene-
fit, noncancellable, long-term coverage under the first definition
-is also the most restrictive on the insurer and the most ex-
pensive. If the corporation is already paying life insurance pre-
miums, the addition of the cost of disability insurance may
render it insurance poor. The alternative of reducing the amount
and duration of the benefits will reduce the cost, but will also
negate the effectiveness of insurance as a funding device.
From a tax standpoint disability insurance may present fur-
ther problems. Section 104 (a) (3) of the Code provides that
amounts received through accident or health insurance for per-
sonal injuries or sickness, except as deductible under the medical
expense provisions, shall not be included in gross income. 0 3
This would apparently include the proceeds of disability income
insurance since the same phrase, "health or accident insur-
ance," is used with reference to employee wage continuation
plans. 0 4 Therefore, it is arguable that a corporation which pays
the premiums will receive the benefit tax free. However, sec-
tion 104(a) (3) refers to payments for personal injury or sickness
and not to the receipt of benefits by one other than the person
disabled. Thus the corporation, which is taxable on the pre-
mium payments,10 5 may be taxed on the benefits in excess of
the premiums paid.
99. E. FAULKNER, HEALTH INSURANCE 76-81 (1960).
100. Day, supra note 92, at 28; Miller, supra note 91, at 590.
101. If the corporation could take out a group policy on the share-
holders this might not be a problem, but generally it will not be
possible to get the kind of high indenmity coverage necessary with
group insurance. See Smith, Disability Income-Group Coverage, in
LIFE AND HEALiTH INSURANCE HANDBOOK 596-601.
102. See Miller, supra note 91, at 591.
103. INT. REV. CODE § 104(a) (3).
104. Treas. Reg. § 1.105-1(d) (1964).
105. See Rev. Rul. 66-262, 1966 INT. Rnv. BULL. No. 36, at 9.
[Vol. 52:483
DISABILITY BUY-OUTS
An additional tax problem when the insurance is wholly
owned by the corporation is the possibility that the premiums
will be treated as dividends to the shareholders. However, the
attempt to treat death buy-out life insurance premiums as divi-
dends has been disallowed by the courts'0 6 and the Internal Reve-
nue Service has acquiesced in these decisions. 10 7 The similarity
of corporate purpose indicates that the same result should follow
with disability insurance,0 8 but the uncertainty of whether a dis-
ability injures the corporation dictates caution in discounting
the prospect of an adverse result.
B. THE CHOICE OF PURCHASER
There are three possible purchasers the planner may choose:
(1) the corporation itself-the entity purchase agreement; (2)
the other shareholders-the cross-purchase agreement; or (3) a
buy-out trust funded with insurance or other assets. 0 9 Al-
though the decision as to which of these alternatives is most ef-
fective will depend on the facts of the case, some of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of the cross-purchase and trust type of
agreements, as opposed to an entity purchase, can be generally
stated.
The choice between an entity and a cross-purchase agree-
ment 10 will depend on several factors such as cross insurance and
individual cost reduction. If insurance is involved,"' under a
cross-purchase agreement, each shareholder must possess a dis-
ability policy on every other shareholder sufficient to allow him
to purchase a part of that shareholder's stock. If there are five
106. See, e.g., Sanders v. Fox, 253 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958); Prunier
v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818 (lst Cir. 1957); Casale v. Commissioner,
247 F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957).
107. Rev. Rul. 59-184, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 65.
108. Cf. Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284
F.2d 737, 744 (4th Cir. 1960).
109. See Polasky, Planning for the Disposition of a Substantial In-
terest in a Closely Held Business, 46 IowA L. REv. 516 (1961).
110. See generally Cunningham, Stock "Buy-Out" Plans: Selection
and Drafting, 18 MD. L. R.v. 277, 278, 284 (1958); Polasky, supra note
109, at 518; Stoeber, Stock Redemption v. Cross-Purchase Agreements
in Closely-Held Corporations, 17 3. AM. Soc'y C.L.U. 212 (1963);
Walker, Life Insurance From the Standpoint of the Federal Corporate
and Personal Income Tax, Gift Tax, and Estate Tax, U. So. CAL. 1966
TAX INST. 543, 564.
111. In either case the insurable interest requirement should not
be a problem since the existence of the agreement will place the pur-
chaser under a financial obligation in the event of disability. See gen-
erally 4 J. APPLEmAN, INSURANCE § 2123 (1941); W. VANCE, INSURANCE
§ 28 (3d ed. 1951).
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shareholders in the corporation, twenty policies will be involved.
Thus the complexity and cost may make this type of agreement
impractical.
If the shareholders are paying for the insurance out of divi-
dends, the funds available for premiums will be reduced by a
second tax. Furthermore, if the share distribution is unequal,
those receiving the smallest dividends must carry the greatest
amount of insurance to buy out the largest holdings. The cross-
purchase type of agreement also means smaller payments from
several sources for the disabled shareholder rather than a large
payment from one source. Should a purchasing shareholder be
unable to meet his obligation at the time it falls due, he will be





Furthermore, the problem of the disabled shareholder's fail-
ing to qualify for continued benefits due to the restrictive second
definition or a partial recovery may make a shareholder reluctant
to bind himself to purchase stock on the strength of the benefit
payments. Mitigating against the cost of insurance in the case
of a death buy-out is the fact that a shareholder is assured his
estate will recover the premiums paid, either by retaining the
policies until the insured shareholders die, selling them back
to those shareholders, or simply turning them in for their cash
surrender value. With disability insurance there is no certainty
that the policies will pay off even if retained, and their value in
a sale will not equal the amount of the premiums paid.
The factors favoring the cross-purchase are that it splits up
the cost of the stock among several purchasers and eliminates
many of the most difficult problems encountered in establish-
ing an entity purchase agreement. The state corporate law re-
strictions affecting the funds available for the purchase are
not applicable to the shareholders. Therefore, a shareholder
building up a fund to purchase stock does not face the possibility
of an accumulated earnings tax. There is no danger the pre-
miums he pays will be a dividend to the other shareholders, and
the sale to another shareholder could not be classed as a dividend
to the seller under section 302.
The use of a trust for a disability buy-out is conspicuous in
its absence from the suggested methods of formulation previously
encountered. This is unusual since the trust need hold only one
policy per shareholder. It can thus effectively eliminate the
112. Rev. Rul. 58-614, 1958-2 CuM. BuLL. 920; Wall v. United States,
164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947).
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multiple policy problem found in an insurance-funded cross-
purchase agreement.
However, the trust faces the same problems as the corpora-
tion or a shareholder in its obligation to purchase stock if the
benefit payments cease. In the case of the trust, the problem
is more severe since the policy is the trust's only source of funds
for making payments. Furthermore, since this arrangement in-
volves three separate entities connected with the policy-the
trust holding policies payable to itself, the shareholder whose
contingent disability is the risk, and the corporation which pays
the premiums-there may be some difficulty finding an insurer.
A corporate entity paying the premiums on a policy it owns,
payable to the entity, arguably involves no dividend conse-
quences to the shareholders. 113 However, if the policies are in a
trust established so that the corporation and its creditors cannot
reach the payments, there is some danger that the payment of
premiums will be treated as a dividend on the rationale that
they are primarily for the benefit of the shareholders and not
the corporation.1 14
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR DRAFTING A Buy-OUT AGREEMENT
As in the drafting of any contractual agreement, there is
a need for clear, precise definitions. "Disability" is the most
difficult term to define and the one most requiring a clear ex-
planation. The problems involving insurance policy definitions
have been considered, but it is suggested that to go beyond a
policy definition in drawing the agreement if insurance is to be
113. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
114. See Paramount-Richard Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.
2d 602 (5th Cir. 1946). To answer this problem and to fulfill the desire
of the shareholder to insulate the trust from the corporation and its
creditors a planner should: 1) provide that the shareholder designate
the beneficiary of the policies; 2) have them direct that the trustee
turn over the shares to the corporation upon their receipt; and 3) hope
that Rev. Rul. 59-184, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 65, which stated that payment
of premiums on life insurance policies held by the corporation were not
dividends, will be read broadly enough to include this situation.
Further difficulty is encountered by a Subchapter S corporation
which opts to use a trust for buy-out purposes. Under § 1371 only an
individual or an estate may hold shares in such a corporation and
§ 1372(e) (3) will terminate the corporation's Subchapter S election if
at any time it ceases to qualify under § 1371. Thus it may be argued
that, even if immediately on receipt of the stock the trust passes it on
to the corporation or the other shareholders, the trust became a stock-
holder at the time it purchased the shares and thereby disqualified
the corporation. Smith, Recent Developments in the Field of Cor-
porate Business Purchase Agreements, 14 TAx L. REv. 413, 432 (1959).
19671
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the funding device will serve only to compound these already
existing difficulties. However, one contingency the parties may
wish to provide for, even if the insurance policy does not, is the
possibility of a disabling mental illness.
Where insurance is not used, the definition of disability
found in an insurance policy remains a good basic point from
which to begin; another source may be a workman's compensa-
tion statute. Before adopting a definition from any source, it is
important to investigate the interpretation, if any, it has re-
ceived in the courts. Furthermore, since the definition ulti-
mately decided upon must, of necessity, be cast in broad terms,
a provision for arbitration in the event of subsequent disagree-
ment should be inserted.
A second major consideration for the draftsman is the valua-
tion of the shares. Failure to provide adequately for this in ad-
vance invites dissension and litigation when the buy-out be-
comes operative. If there is a death buy-out agreement in effect
which deals with the problem in a manner acceptable to the
parties, it may be incorporated into the disability purchase agree-
ment. If incorporation of a prior agreement's solution is not
used, the following guidelines should be utilized: (1) adopt
recognized standards for valuation; 115 (2) provide for periodic
revaluation while the agreement is in force; (3) make the time
for final valuation explicit in terms of the definition of disability
and other phases of the buy-out procedure; (4) state in detail
any special considerations desired by the parties or required by
the type of business; 116 and (5) provide for arbitration of any
disputes as to the method or value."7
Related to the question of valuation are problems of method
and manner of payment. Two possible fund sources have been
mentioned, the retained earnings of the corporation and disability
insurance benefits. Another source is life insurance policies held
by the purchaser on the seller. Such policies may be used either
by turning them in and applying the cash surrender value to
the purchase, transferring the policies themselves as considera-
115. These would include (1) liquidation value, (2) book value,
(3) capitalization of earnings, and (4) replacement value. See gener-
ally 2 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 7.24 (1958); Block, Book Value
Pitfalls in Buy-Sell Agreements, 95 TRUSTS & ESTATES 408 (1956).
116. An example of this would be the procedure to be invoked in
arriving at a present value of inventory held for sale.
117. If arbitration is to be provided for it is advisable to specify
whether the arbitrators are to use the standard provided in the agree-
ment, or whether they will be free to adjust that standard to the pre-
vailing conditions at the time the agreement becomes operative.
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tion, or borrowing against them to raise the necessary funds.118
Whatever source the parties agree on should be incorporated
into the agreement. Also, if payment is to be by installment, the
agreement should state the time and amount of the installments,
the amount of interest, whether interest will be computed on the
whole purchase price or the unpaid balance, and whether the
purchaser is to give evidences of indebtedness. The agreement
should also make provision for the possibility of default by the
purchaser, including safeguards designed to protect the share-
holder's interest.
The agreement should provide for a time lapse between the
date a shareholder becomes disabled, within the agreement
definition, and the date his stock is to be transferred to the pur-
chaser. This period will allow time to value the shares and,
more importantly, to avoid a premature termination of the share-
holder's interest. Depending on the wishes of the parties and the
nature of the business, a period of from ninety days to five years
is possible, but one year should be an acceptable time. The
salary a shareholder is to receive during this period, and whether
and how long such salary is to continue after the buy-out be-
comes operative, are questions to be settled at the time the agree-
ment is made and included therein.
It must be determined whether the buy-out is to be manda-
tory after the initial period has elapsed. If there is to be a formal
agreement, the buy-out should be mandatory. In view of the
many variables involved in such an agreement, however, an
escape clause should be provided. The parties should look ahead
and attempt to determine those factors which may change suf-
ficiently to make the buy-out disadvantageous and include them
in the escape clause.
The possibility of the shareholder's death during the buy-out
period has been mentioned. If a lump sum payment of the re-
maining debt is not provided for, it is suggested that at least a
portion of the remainder be callable by the deceased share-
holder's executor to meet estate expenses and avoid the sale of
other assets.
Other important problems the drafter must consider and
provide for include (1) the possibility of a forced sale of any
shareholder's stock while the agreement is in effect; (2) other
118. If the policies are not to be disposed of it is suggested that a
waiver of premium rider be included, thereby releasing the premium




persons having an interest in the stock, e.g., the wife of a share-
holder in a community property state, who should be made a
party to the agreement; and (3) the need for restriction on vol-
untary transfers of the stock prior to a disabling accident or
illness.
V. CONCLUSION
Writers advocating corporate use of disability insurance
make many arguments in favor of establishing a disability buy-
out agreement. However, it is far from a one-sided question.
In the proper situation a buy-out agreement can be of great
benefit to the parties involved. In the wrong situation it may
be a severe burden on both the corporation and the shareholders.
Before entering such an agreement, the pros and cons should
be considered carefully. In some situations, dissolution of the
corporation may be the only realistic solution when a share-
holder becomes disabled. Disability buy-outs are devices of
limited applicability devised as an attempt to make the best of a
bad situation. This fact must be kept in mind in dealing with
each particular case.
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